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INTRODUCTION

Any society that relies on nine unelected judges to resolve the most
serious issues of the day is not a functioning democracy. I just
don't think that a democracy is responsible if it doesn't have a
political, rational, respectful, decent discourse so it can solve these
problems before they come to the Court.1
***
No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.2
*

Associate Dean of Experiential Learning and Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Tech Law
School.
**
Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Tech Law School.
1
Brian Resnick, Anthony Kennedy: The U.S. ‘Is Not a Functioning Democracy,’ NAT. J. (Oct. 4,
2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/domesticpolicy/anthony-kennedy-the-u-s-is-not-afunctioning-democracy-20131004.
2
U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, cl. 1.
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Citizens obviously are sharply divided concerning whether women should
have the right to terminate a pregnancy: some believe that abortion should be
legal only in certain circumstances, such as in the first trimester of pregnancy;
others believe that abortion should be legal only in cases of rape or incest; and
still others would permit abortions at nearly any stage to protect the health of the
mother.3 However, few (if any) debates focus on the process by which abortion
became a fundamental constitutional right or whether that process has had effects
well beyond the issue of abortion itself. Stated another way, little consideration
has been given to either how abortion came to be a fundamental right or why the
process that ultimately identified it as such should be of significant concern and is
worthy of inquiry–and perhaps a healthy amount of skepticism.
The inquiry should begin at the beginning–with the language of the
Constitution. Whether one is a lawyer or layperson, the question must be asked
whether a reasonable interpretation of this language supports creating a right to
terminate a pregnancy at any stage. Before answering that question, consider the
Supreme Court’s holding in Roe v. Wade.4
II.

THE DECISION: IN GRISWOLD’S SHADOWS

One of the most curious things about Roe is that, behind its own
verbal smokescreen, the substantive judgment on which it rests is
nowhere to be found.5
In Roe, the plaintiff challenged a Texas law that prohibited abortions
except to save the life of the mother.6 Texas’s asserted interest was to protect the
life of the unborn fetus.7 In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a woman’s right to
terminate a pregnancy prior to viability, which equates to approximately the first
twenty-two weeks of a pregnancy.8
But how did the Court arrive at this conclusion? The process by which the
Court created this right represented what is arguably an unprecedented example of
judicial overreaching. The Court began, as it did in Griswold, by conceding that
“the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.”9 Nonetheless,
the majority inexplicably concluded that “the Court has recognized that a right of
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist
under the Constitution” in “the penumbras of the Bill of Rights,” and in “the
3

See Gallup Organization, Abortion: Gallup Historical Trends,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx.
4
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5
See Laurence Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term—Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in
the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1973).
6
Roe, 410 U.S. at 118.
7
Id. at 150.
8
Id. at 164.
9
Id. at 152.
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concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”10 Without explaining the textual or historical basis for arriving at
these conclusions, the Court proceeded to infer a right to abortion from the
implied right to privacy:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in
the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.11
That, in a nutshell, is Roe v. Wade. Additionally, the Court relied on
opinions from medical experts to establish a “trimester” abortion framework.12
Under this approach, women had a nearly unfettered right to abortion in the first
trimester.13 In the second and particularly third trimesters, the State would be
empowered to enact reasonable restrictions on abortion.14 Many people viewed
Roe as a landmark decision protecting women’s privacy and autonomy.
However, Roe proved to be anything but.
How did the Court manage to infer an abortion right out of a constitutional
provision that prohibits the states from depriving persons of “life, liberty, or
property without due process of law?”15 It did something quite extraordinary: it
acknowledged that it was not relying on the Constitution itself. Instead, the Court
looked to Griswold’s invisible penumbras to create from thin air what it could not
interpret from constitutional text.16 Griswold invalidated a Connecticut law that
banned married couples in most circumstances from using contraception.17 Many
reasonable people would agree that the Connecticut legislature’s decision to ban
contraception was "an uncommonly silly law."18 The question before the Court,
however, was whether the law was unconstitutional.19 When interpreting the
plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the Court did in Griswold, the
answer was no.20 After all, Connecticut was not depriving citizens of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law; Connecticut’s law was passed by a
majority vote of legislators who were elected by the people through the
democratic process.21 Thus, how did the Court nonetheless manage to conclude it
violated the Fourteenth Amendment? The Court held that the Fourteenth
10

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
12
Id. at 164.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
16
Roe, 410 U.S. at 129 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
17
381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
18
Id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
19
Id. at 480.
20
Id. at 486.
21
Id. at 480 (providing the actual text of the statutes at issue).
11
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Amendment’s language encompasses a substantive right to privacy, despite
conceding that “the Constitution does not speak in so many words of the right of
privacy in marriage,” and that “no particular provision of the Constitution
explicitly forbids the State from disrupting the traditional relation of the family.”22
Thus, despite candidly acknowledging that a fundamental right of privacy
did not exist in the Constitution, the Court nonetheless managed to conclude that
the Constitution protected a right to privacy.23 To reach this seemingly odd, if not
contradictory result, the Court held that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance.”24 At bottom, the Court concluded that, although the
Fourteenth Amendment does not encompass a right to privacy, it should
encompass this right and therefore it does.25 In so doing, the Court unilaterally
imagined and then created unwritten and invisible “rights” that rise from the
Amendment like steam from a freshly baked potato.
Importantly, by empowering itself to invent implied rights that no
interpretation of the Constitution’s text could support, the Court placed itself at
the forefront of deciding questions that the Constitution expressly entrusts to
citizens through the democratic process. In this regard, the Court signaled a level
of confidence that it could–and should–usurp powers traditionally left to the
electorate on those occasions when the Court, in its view, was in a superior
position to “get it right.” As discussed below, the implications of Griswold are
still being felt today.26 For example, the Court has embraced Griswold’s ethereal
penumbras to create a collection of “rights,” including the right “to define one’s
own concept of existence . . . and the mystery of human life,”27 and a right
“within a lawful realm, to define and express [one’s] identity.”28 What’s more, by
defining these “rights,” in such broad terms, the Court has given itself the power
to recognize additional rights in future–and unforeseeable–contexts. That is a
prescription for judicial review of the most undemocratic kind. Indeed, Roe v.
Wade is arguably the most notorious example of where Griswold’s penumbras,
rather than a reasonable interpretation of the text, self-authorized the Court to
invent a fundamental constitutional right. In many ways Roe is the father of the
Court’s contemporary outcome-based jurisprudence.
III.

THE IMPACT ON DEMOCRACY

“Justice Douglas, you must remember one thing.
At the
constitutional level where we work, 90 percent of any decision is
emotional. The rational part of us supplies the reasons for

22

Id. at 495-96 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Id. at 487.
24
Id. at 484.
25
Id.
26
See infra Part II.
27
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
28
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
23
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supporting our predilection.”29
Only two Justices dissented in Roe.30 Their reasoning was simple: the
Fourteenth Amendment simply does not protect a substantive right to privacy.31
As Justice Rehnquist noted, to find a right to abortion in the Constitution, “the
Court necessarily has had to find within the Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment
a right that was apparently completely unknown to the drafters of the
Amendment.”32 In all likelihood, the Court believed that it was reaching a fair
and just outcome. That, however, is precisely the problem; by focusing on the
utility of the outcome, the Court disregarded the constitutional processes that are
designed to check the Court’s power and promote a participatory democracy.
More specifically, in doing so, the Court: (A) embraced the concept of “living
constitutionalism;” (B) politicized the judicial branch; (B) laid the groundwork for
an unenumerated and outcome-based rights jurisprudence; and (D) upset the
careful balance between the state and federal government.
A.

The Living Constitution

Roe is most troubling because, like Griswold, the Court manipulated, even
disregarded, the Constitution’s text to achieve what seven unelected Justices
believed was the proper outcome. The effect is that Roe became one of the most
prominent 20th Century cases to embrace a fairly recent form of constitutional
interpretation known as “living constitutionalism.”
Simply put, living
constitutionalism states that the meaning of constitutional text provision changes
over time to account for events and issues that the Founders could not foresee.
However, the validity of living constitutionalism turns on whether: (1) the
text in question is ambiguous; (2) the text is reasonably susceptible to a particular
interpretation; and (3) the purpose of the words supports a particular
interpretation.
i.

When the Text is Ambiguous

To illustrate the point regarding ambiguity, consider the text of the Eighth
Amendment: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”33 The text of the Eighth
Amendment is ambiguous because whether bail is “excessive or whether
punishment is “cruel and unusual,” will depend on the facts of a particular case,
and on the attitudes of society as it develops and matures. For example, the
Founders may have considered beheading and burning at the stake to constitute
cruel and unusual punishment, but the Founders could never have considered the
29

Ray Forrester, The New Constitutional Right to Buy Elections, 69 A.B.A. J. 1078, 1082 (1983).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 175
(1973). (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31
See id.
32
Roe, 410 U.S. at 175 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
33
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
30
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question of whether the gas chamber was cruel and unusual because it did not
exist at the time. Thus, courts must inevitably interpret the Constitution in light of
issues and events that the Founders could not foresee, but their interpretation must
nonetheless be consistent with the purpose of the provision. The purpose of the
Eighth Amendment context is to guard against the infliction of unnecessary pain.
Thus, when considering if punishments that did not exist in the Founders era are
cruel and unusual, the Court should be guided, and in a sense limited, by the
question of whether the punishment inflicts unnecessary pain.
ii.

Whether the Text is Reasonably Susceptible to a Particular Interpretation

Regarding whether a provision is susceptible to a particular interpretation,
consider the Fourteenth Amendment: “No state shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”34 The plain language of the
Fourteenth Amendment leaves little room for doubt regarding its meaning: the
state may not deprive citizens of life, liberty, or property unless the state provides
appropriate procedures to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of these rights.
Put differently, “due process of law” qualifies the preceding language and
therefore protects procedural, not substantive, rights. Accordingly, citizens may
challenge state action under the Amendment by arguing that the state’s
procedures were inadequate, and courts may disagree on whether the procedures
adopted in a given case provide “due process of law.”
However, no reasonable interpretation of this language supports the
conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment is a source of substantive
constitutional rights. Of course, it would be a different matter if the Fourteenth
Amendment only stated that “No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or
property.”35 In this situation, courts might disagree about whether life, liberty, or
property encompasses various rights—such as abortion—but that is not what the
Fourteenth Amendment says. Furthermore, inferring substantive rights from the
Fourteenth Amendment leads to an entirely illogical result. If, as the Court held
in Roe, the Fourteenth Amendment protects an unfettered right to terminate a
pregnancy prior to viability, then the Court is essentially saying that no processes
whatsoever could be sufficient to deprive a woman of this right.36 Under that
interpretation, the Court has, as a practical matter, severed the words “due process
of law” from the Fourteenth Amendment and transformed its meaning in a
manner that is wholly inconsistent with what the Founders intended.
Thus, when the Court in Roe and Griswold interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect substantive rights to privacy and abortion not only did it
fail to ascribe a meaning that the words would support, it expressly altered the
very meaning of the provision. In so doing, the Court also disregarded the
constraints on its Article III reviewing authority, because by embracing an
interpretation that the text could not support, the Court gave itself the power to

34

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Id.
36
See Roe, 411 at 152 (1973).
35
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disregard the text in other cases and expand, limit, or create rights as it sees fit.37
In a society where laws are made from the bottom up and democracy is the
avenue by which citizens have a voice in self-governance, the judiciary should
strive to enhance democratic processes, not undermine democracy through an
outcome-based jurisprudence.
iii.

Whether the Purpose of a Law Supports a Particular Interpretation

Courts must consider whether the purpose underlying a particular
constitutional provision supports the court’s interpretation. Consider another
example: citizens are prohibited from smoking cigarettes in a public place.38
Courts interpreting this provision will encounter ambiguity only in determining
whether a citizen was smoking a cigarette in a public place. For example, if a
person smokes a cigarette inside of their car while parked in a deserted lot, are
they in a public place? Courts may disagree about this while also maintaining
consistency with the purpose of the statute.
However, what if someone is smoking a pipe in a crowded movie theater?
There would be no question that the person was in a public place, and certainly
second-hand smoke from a pipe may cause harm to third persons. In this
situation, if a citizen is convicted of a violation of the above law, should a court
uphold the conviction? No. A pipe is not a cigarette. If the legislature wanted to
include pipes, it could have. Since it did not, the judiciary has no authority to
ascribe a meaning to the word “cigarette” that it will not bear.
Put differently, when determining a statute’s purpose, courts must
consider the words as evidence of that purpose, not merely the broader objective
of protecting citizens from second-hand smoke. This approach ensures that a law
will be interpreted as the legislature intended, and not as courts wish to interpret
it. In the same way, the Constitution’s text must be interpreted based on a
reasonable understanding of the Constitution’s words, in light of the purposes that
that the words further, and not as a mere guide that the Court is free to disregard
at its pleasure. Indeed, although the Court is responsible for deciding legal
questions and protecting citizens against tyrannical majorities, it does not have the
authority to decide any legal question based on the Justices’ personal policy
predilections.
This is precisely what the Court did in Roe, however, and the result was to
give courts the power “to determine what is or is not constitutional on the basis of
their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary.” One might ask,
“Why does process matter?” After all, if one agrees that the Court reached a
favorable outcome in Roe, why should the Court’s reasoning be a source of
concern? The answer can be summarized in one word: power.
B.

37

The Politicization of the Judiciary

U.S. CONST. art. III.
For purposes of this example, assume that the purpose of this provision was to protect citizens
from the dangers of second-hand smoke.
38
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The Court’s decision in Roe did tremendous damage to the Court’s
institutional legitimacy. The Roe Court almost unapologetically reached its
decision based solely on the outcome it deemed most desirable, and in the absence
of a faithful interpretation of either the text or history, and certainly with little
concern for the Fourteenth Amendment or respect for democratic processes. As a
result, the Court not only invented a right in Roe; it created the very real
perception that decisions by nine unelected judges were motivated by outcomes
and ideology, not process and reason.
Thus, it should come as no surprise that the federal judiciary has become
increasingly politicized. The process of nominating judges to the federal bench,
particularly the Supreme Court, has become contentious, if not toxic. For
example, in 1986, Robert Bork’s nomination was derailed – and his reputation
severely damaged – after senators in the democratic party all but accused Bork of
being a member of the Ku Klux Klan. At Bork’s nomination hearing, former
Senator Edward Kennedy stated as follows:
Robert Bork's America is a land in which women would be forced
into back-alley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated lunch
counters, rogue police could break down citizens' doors in
midnight raids, schoolchildren could not be taught about evolution,
writers and artists could be censored at the whim of the
Government, and the doors of the Federal courts would be shut on
the fingers of millions of citizens.39
Bork was defeated by a vote of 58-42. Four years later, President George
H.W. Bush nominated Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, and the
confirmation fight that ensued was nothing short of despicable. The Senate
attacked Thomas with unproven allegations of sexual harassment, and shared the
lurid details of this alleged harassment before a nationally-televised audience. In
fact, the nomination process was filled with such vitriol that Thomas angrily
declared the process to be little more than “a high tech lynching for uppity
blacks.”40
There is a reason that the nomination process has become so contentious,
and that reason can be traced to Roe: once the Court got into the business of
deciding cases based upon the desirability of an outcome, elected representatives
perceived, rightfully or not, that ideology would dictate a Justice’s approach to
constitutional interpretation. To an extent, this perception reflects reality. After
all, one can likely predict how the Court will rule based on the ideology of the
Presidents who appointed the Justices. That should make citizens of all political
persuasions uneasy.
In fact, perception met reality in Bush v. Gore, when former Justice John
39

James Reston, Washington; Kennedy and Bork, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1987,
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/05/opinion/washington-kennedy-and-bork.html.
40
American Rhetoric, Clarence Thomas: Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/clarencethomashightechlynching.htm (last visited
xxx).
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Paul Stevens issues a stinging dissent criticizing the Court decisions to end the
2000 election between George W. Bush and Al Gore:
The endorsement of that position by the majority of this Court can
only lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of
judges throughout the land. It is confidence in the men and women
who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the
rule of law. Time will one day heal the wound to that confidence
that will be inflicted by today's decision. One thing, however, is
certain. Although we may never know with complete certainty the
identity of the winner of this year's Presidential election, the
identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's confidence
in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.41
Justice Stevens’s words clearly frame the issue: the process by which we
reach a result is necessarily as important as the result itself. The Court can, as it
did in Griswold and Roe, decide questions that properly belong to the people and
their elected representatives. This result harms all citizens. In Bush v. Gore,
conservatives cheered the Court’s decision, and in Roe v. Wade, progressives
celebrated. That, in a nutshell is the point – and the problem.
C.

The “Implied Rights” Problem

Beginning with Griswold, and continuing with Roe, the Court created an
“implied rights” problem.
Specifically, when courts create fundamental
constitutional rights by inferring those rights from the text rather than from a
reasonable interpretation of its actual words, they lay a new, shifting foundation
upon which additional, phantom rights can be inferred from yet other “implied
rights.” This ad hoc approach to judicial decision-making divorces the courts
from the constraints on their reviewing authority and gives them the power to
independently invent rights that have no relation to the Constitution’s text.
Justice Potter Stewart emphasized this point in Griswold:
What provision of the Constitution, then, does make this state law
invalid? The Court says it is the right of privacy ‘created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees.’
With all
deference, I can find no such general right of privacy in the Bill of
Rights, in any other part of the Constitution, or in any case ever
before decided by this Court.42
Consider the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the rights that were
inferred from that language: No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
41
42

531 U.S. 98, 128-29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 530 (Potter, J., dissenting).
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THE RIGHT ESTABLISHED
Privacy
Abortion (implied from privacy)
Abortion and the right “to define one’s
own concept of existence…and the
mystery of human life”) (implied from
privacy)
Right to engage in private sexual
activity
Right to equal dignity
Right to define and express one’s
identity

To be clear, it does not matter whether one thinks that citizens should have
these rights. The question is whether the Court should be deciding whether these
rights exist. If an asserted right can be supported by the reasonable interpretation
of the text and is consistent with its underlying purposes, the answer is yes. If the
asserted right cannot be so supported and is not consistent with the underlying
purposes, the answer should be no. In Roe, the Court roundly ignored these
principles, and since that time – and in direct response --many states have sought
to eviscerate a women’s right to abortion.
D.

The Federalism Fight

Roe disrupted the delicate balance between the state and federal
government because the Court appeared to be impermissibly overreaching by
deciding matters that were within the state’s powers to regulate. As a result, there
was a backlash against Roe that endangered the very right that Roe created. Over
the years, states have launched indirect attacks on Roe by enacting legislation that,
among other things, required women to obtain the consent of their husband before
having an abortion and, most recently, required abortion providers to obtain
hospital admitting privileges. These attacks continue to this day, and are
motivated by the belief that the Court overstepped its constitutional authority. To
the surprise of some, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a staunch supporter of
abortion rights, criticized Roe’s broad language, stating that “[h]eavy-handed
judicial intervention [in the context of Roe] was difficult to justify and appears to
have provoked, not resolved, conflict.”43 Justice Ginsburg argued in favor of an
incremental approach that would allow the Court to “put its stamp of approval on
the side of change and let that change develop in the political process.”44

43

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63
N.C. L. REV. 375, 385-86 (1985).
44
Interview by Geoffrey Stone with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. J., U.S. Sup. Ct., in Chi., Ill.
(May 11, 2013), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/video/ginsburg051113.
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CONCLUSION

If you are among the many Americans—of whatever sexual
orientation—who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all
means celebrate today’s decision. Celebrate the achievement of a
desired goal. Celebrate the opportunity for a new expression of
commitment to a partner. Celebrate the availability of new
benefits. But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to
do with it.45
When Chief Justice John Roberts wrote those words in Obergefell, he
expressed a sentiment that should alarm citizens across the political and
ideological spectrum to dissent: the Court cheated the people by disregarding the
Constitution and disrespecting the voices of millions of citizens. Although Justice
Roberts acknowledged the “undeniable appeal”46 of arguments in favor of samesex marriage, he adhered to a principle that has universal appeal: the right of the
people to decide questions to which the Constitution does not speak, and to which
judicial review is unsuited. As Justice Scalia stated in United States v. Windsor:
We might have covered ourselves with honor today, by promising
all sides of this debate that it was theirs to settle and that we would
respect their resolution. We might have let the People decide. But
that the majority will not do. Some will rejoice in today's decision,
and some will despair at it; that is the nature of a controversy that
matters so much to so many. But the Court has cheated both sides,
robbing the winners of an honest victory, and the losers of the
peace that comes from a fair defeat. We owed both of them better.
I dissent.47
Justices Roberts and Scalia were right, and Roe is the culprit that ushered
in a new era of judicial review that should cause citizens across the political and
ideological spectrum to dissent. The cases that followed in Roe’s wake,
regardless of whether one celebrates the outcomes, were based on the “mystical
aphorisms of the fortune cookie,” not any reasonable interpretation of the
Constitution.48

45

Obergefell, et al. v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2626 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2611.
47
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2711 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
48
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2630, n. 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
46

